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UNVEILING INFORMANT TESTIMONY:  THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JENCKS ACT
Stephen C. Leckar*
The Jencks Act (Act)1† unconstitutionally impedes a
defendant’s access to justice and due process of law by limiting
a defendant’s ability to receive information that is crucial to an
effective cross-examination of cooperating witnesses.  In the
cash-run underworld where written records are few, statements
made by accomplices and informants who testify under plea
arrangements have become the bedrock of complex federal nar-
cotics prosecutions.  Such witnesses have strong incentives to
distort their testimony and point the finger at the defendant on
trial.  A system that prides itself on fair play cannot tolerate arti-
ficial constraints on the truth-seeking function that the adver-
sary process serves.
The Act currently requires federal prosecutors to dis-
close all of its witness’ “statements.”2 However, the timing, and
indeed, the basic nature of that right are circumscribed.  The
statute provides, in relevant part that “[a]fter a witness called by
the United States has testified on direct examination, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to
produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified. . . .”3 However, the
measure limits the term “statement” to “(1) a written statement
made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him; [or] (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electri-
cal, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said
witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of
such oral statement . . . .”4 Therefore, a witness “statement” as
defined by the Act does not include any number of notes, data
of proffers, discussions, or conversations that arise during testi-
mony preparation with prosecutors.  
Notes and data of proffers and debriefing sessions
often reflect the various ways in which witness statements shift
from the first interview to the actual trial.  By limiting access to
these notes and data, the Act effectively inhibits any attempts by
defense attorneys at using these materials to impeach unreliable
witnesses who are most often motivated by plea deals.
Accordingly, defendants are denied their constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel because an attorney cannot
effectively represent a client when informants can take and dis-
tort the truth or sometimes outright lie on the stand.  Although
the truth may sometimes prevail through cross-examination,
this is not always the case.  This article discusses the motiva-
tions behind witness dissembling, the problems that such false
or embellished testimony presents for juries and defendants,
and finally, what can be done to remedy the situation.
Federal courts have historically overruled defense
counsel’s requests for disclosure of case agents’ FBI “Form
302” interview reports and notes generated during proffers and
debriefings of cooperating witnesses.5 These decisions are typ-
ically upheld unless the agent herself testifies;6 the notes are a
full transcription of the agent’s discussion with the witness,7 or
the witness reviewed and approved or adopted the notes.8
However, demanding the notes be substantially verbatim has
sometimes led to seemingly anomalous results.9
In general, the standard of review for appellate courts
is “abuse of discretion”10 or “clear error.”11 However, appellate
courts are not especially hospitable to alleged violations of the
Act and tend to apply a “harmless error” standard for alleged
violations of the Act and focus tends to turn on whether the vio-
lation was deliberate or inadvertent.12 If the notes are of an
exculpatory in nature and pertinent under the distinct but some-
what overlapping demands of Brady v. Maryland,13 then a dif-
ferent analysis comes into play.  An alleged Brady violation is
adjudicated by determining whether the failure to disclose sig-
nificantly undermined the verdict’s fairness.14 Therefore, in the
normal run of cases, defendants carry a heavy burden on appeal
to show prejudice of a decision to deny discovery of case
agents’ notes.15
The Pitfalls of Prosecuting Cases that 
Depend on Cooperators’ Testimony
Modern federal narcotics and gang violence prosecu-
tions depend heavily on the testimony of cooperating witness-
es.16 As one scholarly commentator has noted, “[t]hese are
deemed ‘historical cases’ because virtually all of the evidence
concerns acts that occurred in the past, often the distant past, for
which there is only ‘one rat after another.’”17 In this respect, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the “serious questions of
credibility” posed by the use of informants testimony.18
All parties involved in the trial process understand – or
at least are instructed at the close of evidence – that both
informants and accomplices are prone to shade the truth in
order to lessen or avoid possible incarceration.19 It is assumed
that the defense will be able to expose the witnesses’ motivation
and mendacity through cross-examination, and in turn, that the
jury will be able to assess credibility and “make the right
call.”20
As an empirical proposition, these assumptions are
very much a myth.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure’s
provisions for discovery21 and the Jencks Act22 operate in a way
that can deprive defendants of their right to effective counsel in
these types of cases.  These statutes have been applied to pre-
clude the defense from access to a basic tool necessary to
advance an informed cross-examination in a complex twenty-
first century criminal case – the documentary records that may
reflect shifting stories given by accomplices’ metamorphosis
into trial witnesses, during proffer sessions.
Empirical Evidence Reveals Grave
Flaws in the Act’s Assumptions
Judicial Deference to the Jencks Act
Introduction
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Thwarting the defense’s access to documentary infor-
mation necessary to achieve effective cross-examination of
cooperating witnesses disserves the truth-seeking function of
the adversary system.  Restricting disclosure wrongly assumes
that defense counsel can, or are willing, to cross-examine blind-
ly.  These restrictions impede the jury’s ability to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses.  Furthermore, contrary to popular
belief, the ability of people to detect falsehood is statistically
not much more accurate than flipping a coin.23 The Jencks Act
and Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
skewed in a way that unconstitutionally maintains the low like-
lihood of detecting falsehoods in cooperating witness testimo-
ny, at the expense of defendants’ right to due process.
The Act and the Associated Criminal Discovery 
Rules Rest on an Empirically Flawed Assumption
As Thomas Paine once observed, “[a] long habit of not
thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of
being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of
custom.”24 The custom of utilizing the Jencks Act to preclude
disclosure of notes of cooperating witnesses’ statements made
during the course of proffers and debriefings denies defendants
access to potentially valuable impeachment material.  The
statute itself is a relic of the latter stages of the McCarthy era
and was enacted under circumstances, which, when examined
in light of contemporary legislative practice, seem remarkably
attenuated.25 The courts themselves have been inconsistent in
explaining why the Act was passed in the first place.26
Recent scholarly authorities have questioned this
shortfall. In the same fashion that Crawford v. Washington27
emerged in the Supreme Court following a vigorous academic
debate over the Confrontation Clause,28 the time has come to
tackle this issue head-on and to address the unconstitutionality,
as applied, of the underlying policy in cases dependent on the
testimony of cooperators working off plea agreements.29
Refusing access to case agents’ notes of proffer and
debriefing conferences with cooperating witnesses is based on
an uncritical assessment and application of the Jencks Act and
Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The
courts have claimed that these provisions are meant to protect
government files from so-called vexatious “fishing expedi-
tions” while assuring defendants a right to compel production
of “statements” that might be useful for impeachment.30 That
claim, it is submitted, is overstated.  Both the Act and the dis-
covery rule implicitly fail to recognize that “memory is highly
fallible, and the process of memory retrieval and reconstruction
[is] extremely fragile.”31 Neither the statute nor the rule
accounts for the possibility that through cooperation and
debriefing sessions with agents and prosecutors, witnesses’
accounts can be adjusted over time, and may emerge in a form
that differs greatly from what the witness claimed the first time
that he sat down with Government agents.  This dovetails into
another factor recognized by some courts.  In determining
whether statements can be used for impeachment purposes, the
witness’s prior account need not be a flat contradiction of her
trial testimony.  An omission from the report of facts related at
trial or a contrast in the way certain facts are emphasized may
be quite material to the defense.32
Witness preparation has been called, perhaps not
unfairly, the “[p]rofession’s [d]irty [l]ittle [s]ecret.”33 It has
been likened to “an art form” in which “American prosecutors
are among its most practiced and capable artists.”34 One need
not look any further than the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles
v. Whitley35 to discern an example of a key witness whose
account of a crime varied so substantially between the time the
police first interviewed him to when he testified that his state-
ment raised “a substantial implication that the prosecutor had
coached him to give it.”36
A similar issue arose in Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional
Institute.37 In that case, one witness, Brown, faced pending nar-
cotics charges when he met with his lawyer on various occa-
sions.38 Brown claimed that the defendant, Spicer, had been
planning a robbery, despite not having seen him on the day of a
brutal assault for which Spicer ultimately was convicted.39
Seeking a bargain in his own case, Brown then directed his
lawyer go to the prosecutor with this information.40 During the
prosecutor’s interview, Brown suddenly claimed to have seen
Spicer fleeing from the crime scene, making Brown an eyewit-
ness, and thus a key element in the case because of other wit-
nesses’ inconclusive identification testimony.41 In court,
Brown repeated his claim, but added that he had told his lawyer
the same account prior to the plea agreement.42 However, the
prosecutor never informed Spicer’s counsel of the inconsisten-
cy between Brown’s initial proffer to the prosecutor and his
more expansive and inculpatory version of the facts.43
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that habeas was due
because the inconsistency in Brown’s testimony could have
served as a powerful tool for Spicer had he known of it at the
time of his trial.44
The concerns illustrated in Kyles and Spicer are hard-
ly novel as “[m]any studies describe the distorting effects of
suggestive questioning.”45 As these cases illustrate, the poten-
tial prejudice arising from the shifting testimony of pathologi-
cal liars and cooperating witnesses after these persons have sat
through private proffer and debriefing sessions with law
enforcement agents is palpable. 
Cooperating Witnesses have Numerous
Motivations to Dissemble
An estimated one percent of Americans are pathologi-
cal liars.46 Putting these people aside for the moment,
“[a]ccomplices, if they give information or testify, may have a
natural tendency to lie in order to minimize their part in the
crime.”47 Their motivations to perjure themselves may vary,
but there is scant doubt that any number of factors, including
the desire to minimize incarceration, may motivate coopera-
tors.48 Fear, revenge, the belief that if he or she does not testi-
fy against a co-defendant the co-defendant may testify against
him, as a means of reordering a previously hierarchical relation-
ship by testifying against a superior, the desire to take over an
organization after helping to put the co-defendant away, and so
forth, all constitute possible motivations to commit perjury.49
Cooperating witnesses, which in the underlying cases
constitute the vast majority of the law enforcement witnesses,
are susceptible to several extraneous influences. They are “(1)
easily manipulated by coercive and suggestive interviewing
techniques; (2) readily capable of giving false and embellished 
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testimony with the prosecutor’s knowledge, acquiescence,
indifference, or ignorance; (3) readily capable of creating false
impressions by omissions or memory alterations that in the
absence of any recordation or documentation eludes disclosure
and impeachment; and (4) able to present . . . testimony to the
jury in a truthful and convincing manner, which because of the
nature of the cooperation process is difficult to impeach through
cross-examination.”50
Two other factors exacerbate the problem of shifting
accounts arising from proffer sessions. The Sentencing
Guidelines, for one, “create a powerful incentive for coopera-
tors to exaggerate and falsify information.”51 It blinks at reali-
ty to think that the Guidelines do not create a powerful incen-
tive to lie and derail the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal
justice system.52 Even within the Justice Department, “there
are few, if any, internal standards for substantial assistance to
guide the discretion of prosecutors” and the Department’s
Principles of Federal Prosecution “do not require a prosecutor
to take into account the truthfulness, reliability,
or completeness of a defendant’s testimony
when making a substantial assistance determi-
nation.”53 At the very least, “there is serious
concern that this unregulated process corrupts
the truth because it ‘encourage[s] some defen-
dants to exaggerate or falsify information’ in
order to obtain their [U.S.S.G.] 5K1.1 letter.”54
Aside from the Guidelines’ sentencing
regime, complex prosecutions developed
through the use of informants are characterized
by another problem: the nature of the interac-
tion between prosecution agents and coopera-
tors.  The problem is:
Witnesses don’t just take the stand and produce nice 
narratives in response to non-leading questions with
out considerable work that the uninitiated cannot pos-
sibly appreciate.55
The process by which prosecutors debrief the cooper-
ating witness during proffer sessions and then prepare 
the witness to testify at trial is typically lengthy, meas-
ured in multiple interviews that occur over many 
weeks, if not months.56
As an experienced appellate judge has remarked, “[i]f
you decide to call an informer as a witness, you will 
end up spending much time with him preparing for his 
testimony.”57
Experts describe these proffer and debriefing conferences as
“the flashpoint which triggers perjury”58 and “the black hole of
corroboration”59 because they are fertile ground for evidence of
cooperators’ inconsistent statements and bias to surface.60
“[B]y their own admission these people are criminals, so they
have already demonstrated a tendency to disregard legal norms”
as well as being “by nature and definition … manipulative and
self-interested; after being apprehended for commission of a
crime, they have sought to use information in their possession
to their advantage by bargaining against their confederates.”61
As these meetings unfold, cooperating witnesses are
able to determine what the prosecutor wants to hear and can
shift their recollections accordingly.62 How prosecutors act
during sessions with cooperating witnesses drive the proffer
system and “. . . inducements for false testimony are very often
the direct result of what prosecutors say at the proffers.”63 As
one observer wrote:
[W]hen a prosecutor tells a defendant or defense coun-
sel what testimony is expected of the defendant (either
in detail or in the form of bullet points) in order to 
qualify for cooperator/leniency/immunity status, the 
defendant is powerfully motivated to parrot what the 
prosecution wants and expects to hear. Similarly, if the 
defendant or his or her counsel provides a proffer of 
facts, which is then followed by the prosecutor 
announcing that those facts are insufficient or inaccu-
rate, again the cooperating witness is powerfully moti-
vated to ‘change the story’ to accommodate the prose-
cutor's version of the truth.64
To be sure, some might retort that the disclo-
sure at trial of subject matter that the Jencks Act
permits in conjunction with cross-examination
suffices to explore inconsistencies, but, that is a
mistaken view.  The numerous factors that moti-
vate cooperating witnesses to lie at trial, com-
bined with the prosecutors’ encouragement for
them to do so, makes it incredibly difficult, if not
impossible, for defense attorneys to prevent dis-
crepancies without access to documentation of
proffers and debriefing notes.
Uninformed Cross-examination is not a Panacea
The criminal justice system has traditionally assumed
that attorneys can uncover witness “coaching” through skillful
cross-examination, supposedly the “greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.”65 The reality is, however,
that “there is no empirical basis for this assumption.”66
Studies by The Innocence Project, a national litigation
and public policy organization working to exonerate wrongful-
ly convicted individuals67 demonstrate that “the adversary sys-
tem alone is not enough to correct the mistaken judgments of
prosecutors concerning the testimony of cooperators and jail-
house snitches.”68 Presumably, ethical prosecutors recognize
that “any variations in an accomplice witness’s proposed testi-
mony could be considered favorable to the defense and the exis-
tence of such differences should be disclosed under Brady.”69
On the other hand, not all prosecutors are scrupulous.
In Banks v. Dretke, the Supreme Court took the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to task for the court’s cursory
review of habeas cases.70 In particular, the Court noted the
Fifth Circuit’s surprising lack of reference to Strickler v.
Greene,71 the controlling precedent on whether cause and prej-
udice exists for Brady prosecutorial misconduct claims.72 In
cases such as Banks, a thorough habeas review is necessary
because some prosecutors deliberately misrepresent and con-
ceal evidence that is critical to the impeachment of an inform-
ant.73
Even if all prosecutors err on the side of timely and full
disclosure, courts’ blind trust that cross-examination will reveal
The criminal justice system has
traditionally assumed that
attorneys can uncover witness
“coaching” through skillful
cross-examination, supposedly
the “greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of
truth.”  The reality is, however,
that “there is no empirical
basis for this assumption.”
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inconsistencies fails to address the taint that arises when one
does not know the process by which the prosecutor questioned
the witness or the subtle ways in which an accomplice’s story
can be reworked over time.  Furthermore, the problem is: 
. . . compounded by the fact that prosecutors cannot 
always know what the value of evidence might be to 
the defense.  They may have no experience in thinking 
strategically from a defense point of view and they 
may lack knowledge about how the evidence in ques-
tion could corroborate the defendant’s version of 
events.74
Absent documentation of the underlying process, if the cross-
examiner is: 
lacking a factual basis to believe that a witness’s mem-
ory has been manipulated, that an ‘I don’t remember’ 
is false or misleading, or that a failure to mention an 
incriminating fact is the product of improper coaching, 
it is unlikely that a cross-examiner would focus on the 
discrepancy, or be able to prepare an effective 
impeaching strategy about something of which he is 
ignorant.75
Without any documentation of the interview process: 
a jury may not learn whether the cooperating witness 
made inconsistent statements over the course of the 
interview process, whether the prosecution inadver-
tently (or deliberately) fed information to the witness 
that made the witness’s testimony appear more cred-
ble and confident than it otherwise would have 
appeared, or whether the prosecution made any 
unrecorded threat or inducement to the cooperator that
may have motivated the witness to testify.76
Such a process surpasses accepted standards of fair
play, for, “[t]o shackle counsel so that he cannot effectively
seek out the truth and afford the accused the representation
which is not his privilege but his absolute right seems seriously
to imperil the bedrock presumption of innocence.”77
Unenlightened Juries are Poor Evaluators of Credibility
Some might suggest that it is reasonable to assume that
the jury will make the right call.  But a jury cannot always
determine credibility by observing a witness’s conduct.  The
fact of the matter is that “[u]nder the most spontaneous circum-
stances, trial demeanor is an inconsistent barometer of witness
credibility.  In the case of a well-prepared accomplice,
demeanor may be a useless measure at best . . .”78
This proposition has been empirically validated over
time, as “[d]ozens of studies have been conducted and statisti-
cally analyzed.  When the studies are combined, a compelling
pattern emerges – that as a general rule, people are poor human
lie detectors.”79 Not only is the average person’s ability to fer-
ret out truth from falsehood about on the order of being “bare-
ly better, statistically, than flipping a coin,”80 but:
[t]o make matters worse, this research has shown that 
people are more confident than they should be in their 
ability to make these judgments – and that accuracy 
and confidence are not statistically correlated.  What 
that means is that people who are highly confident in 
their lie detection skills are not more accurate than 
those who express low to modest levels of confi-
dence.81
Even if the information calling the veracity of inform-
ant testimony into question ultimately surfaces, the prosecutor’s
disclosure only after a witness testifies at trial presents obsta-
cles to witness impeachment.  In this respect, United States v.
Owens explains that:
The failure to provide full disclosure of the govern-
ment's case early in the proceedings limits a defen-
dant's ability to investigate the background and charac-
ter of government witnesses and the veracity of their 
testimony. For example, strict compliance with the 
Jencks Act necessitates frequent delays and adjourn-
ments. Counsel often needs time to digest and investi-
gate the information received. As a practical matter, 
any thorough investigation at that juncture of the pro-
ceedings may usually be impossible, and counsel must 
do the best that they can in the brief time usually allot-
ted. The court and the jury are inconvenienced by even 
brief delays; the rights of the defendants are jeopard-
ized because such delays, if granted, often are not suf-
ficient. The restrictions not only impinge upon the 
right of defendants to a fair trial, but also severely 
hamper the orderly process of criminal trials. They are 
wrong in principle and cause delay in practice.82
“We know that the traditional assumptions about the
adversary system – that the parties are essentially balanced in
power and that the truth will emerge in the contest between
them – are simply not true in a significant number of cases.” 83
Given the above concerns, “ … whatever limitations juries may
have … it is surely true that more information about the coop-
erator’s odyssey from target to government witness would
improve jurors’ credibility assessments in this area.”84 And
even though prosecutors are supposed to resolve all “doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure,”85 the Government is hardly in
an informed position to know what may be useful to defense
counsel seeking to probe a prospective trial witness’s credibili-
ty. Even if they were informed, they have an incentive – such as
securing a conviction – to not turn over that information. At a
minimum, disclosure of all notes and documentation generated
during proffer and debriefing sessions is necessary to place the
defense on an even footing in these situations.86 Disclosure of
agents’ notes also would be an incentive to encourage honest
police work. 
Courts do not hesitate in other contexts to strike down
irrational rules that lack empirical substantiation.  For instance,
in Bechtel v. FCC,87 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit determined that no objective evidence exist-
ed to support the FCC’s so-called owner integration rule, a
hoary doctrine that awarded credits towards licensure for appli-
cants who promised to be involved actively in running their sta-
The Remedy
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tions.88  If prospective radio station licensees have a statuto-
ryright under the Administrative Procedure Act89 not to be sub-
ject to arbitrary government action that is rooted in empirically
unsound propositions, then it is hard to see why the Constitution
should permit a defendant whose liberty is potentially at stake
to be subject to equally flawed legislative restrictions. 
In light of history and objective realities, the Jencks
Act, to the extent it has been applied to restrict access to notes
of proffers and debriefings, unconstitutionally abrogates the
rights to Due Process and effective assistance of counsel.  The
courts have and should exercise their supervisory powers to
fashion a prophylactic procedural rule requiring disclosure of
such notes during the pretrial process.90
1 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).  The Jencks Act was enacted in the
closing moments of the 1957 legislative year as a reaction to the
decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in
which the Supreme Court had ordered the production of state-
ments made to the FBI by informants involved in a celebrated
prosecution of alleged communists. Legislation to repeal the
Court’s decision was introduced the day after it was adopted
and the measure was enacted in little over two months.
2 Id. § 3500(c).  
3 Id. § 3500(b).  
4 Id. § 3500(e)(1)-(2).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal of indictment for prosecutorial
misconduct); United States v. Brown, 303 F.3d 582 (5th Cir.
2002) (refusing to allow defense to question FBI agent about
the contents of his notes did not violate defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219
F.3d 300, 316 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that witness
“target letters” were a basis for prosecutorial misconduct);
United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 775-76 (1st Cir.
1998); United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1996); United States v. Redding, 16 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 586-
87 (1st Cir. 1987).  
6 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 490-91 (5th
Cir. 1987). 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 597-98 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-
53 (1959)); Jordan, 316 F.3d at 1255 (finding FBI Form 302
reports not sufficiently verbatim to warrant disclosure);
Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding non-verbatim, non-adopted notes not discoverable);
Donato, 99 F.3d at 433 (clarifying agent’s notes not witness’s
“own words”); United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir.
1995) (refusing to require prosecutors to disclose verbatim
statements if the author merely selected portions of lengthy oral
statement); United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1391 (6th
Cir. 1994); United Stares v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1105 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating that brief quotations are not discoverable).  
8 See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 110 n.19
(1976); Oruche, 484 F.3d at 598, 599 n.1 (deciding that before
a case agent’s notes qualified as Jencks materials, the witness
must in some way have signed or signified her approval of the
agent’s notations and that the Act’s definition of “statement”
also required that it be “signed or otherwise approved by [the
testifying witness]”); Jordan, 316 F.3d at 1255 (no evidence
that witness adopted statement); United States v. Padin, 787
F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1986) (refusing to require produc-
tion of DEA agents’ debriefing report that summarized a wit-
ness interview because the witness did not “clearly and unam-
biguously adopt the report since she neither signed, read, nor
had it read to her”). 
9 Compare United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 863 n.8 (1st
Cir. 1991) (determining that agent’s raw notes were not Jencks
material even though agent had read back notes to witness dur-
ing interview in order to verify accuracy) with United States v.
Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645-46 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that
when a government agent interviews a witness and takes con-
temporaneous notes of the witness’ responses, the notes do not
become the witness’ “statement,” despite the agent's best efforts
to be accurate, if the agent does not read back, or the witness
does not read, what the agent has written).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir.
1996); Gross, 961 F.2d at 1104.
11 See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493
(1963); United States v. Redding, 16 F.3d 298, 301 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Grunewald, 86 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 587
(1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1525
(11th Cir. 1984); Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (finding that withholding production “not an
ordinary finding of fact” but “factual conclusion arrived at by
applying legal standard to the other facts found;” if trial judge’s
decision at odds with underlying facts or based on misapplica-
tion of law, clearly erroneous standard governs).
12 See Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 112 n.21 (holding that “[s]ince
courts cannot ‘speculate whether [Jencks material] could have
been utilized effectively’ at trial … the harmless-error doctrine
must be strictly applied in Jencks Act cases”); Oruche, 484 F.3d
at 596; United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Where. . . Jencks Act violation is inadvertent, the defendant
must establish that there is a significant chance that the added
item would instill a reasonable doubt in a reasonable juror.”)
(citing United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 943 (2d Cir.
1997));  United States v. Susskind, 4 F.3d 1400, 1401 (6th Cir.
1993); Alvarez, 86 F.3d at 907-08; United States v. Roemer, 703
F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1983).
13 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Oruche, 484 F.3d 590, 597 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s grant of new trial for Brady
violations); United States v. Haire, 371 F.3d 833, 841 (D.C. Cir.
2004), vac’d on other grds, 543 U.S. 1109 (2005) (“Brady does
not require that the prosecutor ‘deliver his entire file to defense
counsel, but only [that he] disclose evidence favorable to the
accused, that if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.’”).
15 See, e.g., Haire, 371 F.3d at 841 (“We will not find error on
the mere speculation that files, such as the debriefing material
not disclosed herein, may contain Brady information.”); United
States v. Due, 205 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (refusing to
recognize any prejudice arising from court’s failure to order
production of notes because disclosure would not materially aid
attack on witness’ credibility); United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d
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† 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000) (The Jencks Act)
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which
was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpe-
na, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on
direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant,
order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter
defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to
the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court
shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his
examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be
produced under this section contains matter which does not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the
court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for
the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the
court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With
such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of
such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such
procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the
defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and
the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defen-
dant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the
United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be
made available to the appellate court for the purpose of deter-
mining the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever
any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this sec-
tion, the court in its discretion, upon application of said defen-
dant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may
determine to be reasonably required for the examination of such
statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the
trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the
court under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defen-
dant any such statement, or such portion thereof as the court
may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony
of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its
discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require
that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term “statement”, as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d)
of this section in relation to any witness called by the United
States, means--
(1) a written statement made by said witness and 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a sub-
stantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by 
said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the 
making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a tran-
scription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a 
grand jury.
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